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Through an Imperial Prism: Land, Liberty, and
Highland Loyalism in the War of American
Independence
Matthew P. Dziennik
A s he toured the island of Coll in 1773, Samuel Johnson’s concernwas evident: “And all [Highlanders] that go may be considered assubjects lost to the British crown; for a nation scattered in the bound-
less regions of America resembles rays diverging from a focus. All the rays remain,
but the heat is gone. Their power consisted in their concentration: when they are
dispersed, they have no effect.”1 Emigration to America from the Highlands and
islands of Scotland had become an “epidemical fury,” which could only play into
the hands of “our colonies in America [which] are daily growing in power.” This
anonymous commentator predicted that Gaelic emigrants would “make excellent
partizans for the first enterprising genius that shall aspire to form an independent
establishment.”2 Such fears were largely misplaced. Highland residents of the col-
onies (approximately 20,000 people, concentrated mainly around the Mohawk
Valley in New York, the Cape Fear Valley in North Carolina, and Darien, Georgia)
proved to be a significant part of the loyalist population.3 Making up no more
than 0.8 percent of the colonial population, Highlanders may have accounted for
more than 10 percent of those who served in loyalist units during the Revolutionary
War.4 When the king’s standard was raised at Cross Creek, North Carolina, in
Matthew P. Dziennik is a doctoral candidate in the School of History, Classics, and Archaeology at
the University of Edinburgh. His dissertation explores, through the medium of military service, the
relationships between the Scottish Highlands, the British state, and the British Empire in North America
during the eighteenth century.
1 Samuel Johnson, A Journey to the Western Islands of Scotland (London, 1775), 305.
2 The Present Conduct of the Chieftains and Proprietors of Lands in the Highlands of Scotland . . .
Considered impartially by a Highlander (Edinburgh, 1773), 7.
3 These figures detail the arrivals post-1763, though there may have been several thousand more
that arrived earlier as traders, political exiles, and soldiers. Emigration figures are difficult to detail in
any precise sense given the lack of empirical data and the hyperbole of eighteenth-century emigration
literature, but for the most detailed estimate, see Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the
Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution (New York, 1986), 89–113.
4 Estimates indicate that there were approximately 2.5 million British subjects in the colonies in
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February 1776, 1,200 Highlanders took up arms, representing 40 percent of the
eligible Highland male population of the colony, a rate of mobilization probably
not matched during the war.5 Moreover, Highland Loyalism had an impact on
British policy that far exceeded the military potential of Gaelic communities. It
was the assertions of the governor of North Carolina, Josiah Martin, that the
Highlanders would rise that prompted the dispatch from Cork of Henry Clinton’s
expeditionary force to that American colony, despite the reservations of the Amer-
ican secretary, William Legge, second earl of Dartmouth, and General William
Howe in Boston. The defeat of the Highlanders at Moore’s Creek, near Wil-
mington, North Carolina, in February 1776 undermined the already shaky resolve
for the southern option and prevented Clinton’s dispatch to Dunmore in Virginia,
where he may have been more usefully employed.6
Given the extent of Highland loyalism, historians have been much less concerned
than Johnson was about the loyalties of the emigrants. The widespread support
of the Highlanders for the British crown has largely been understood as self-
evident, derived from a number of ethnic paradigms, with the central theme the
assertion that Highland loyalism can be understood through reference to tradi-
tional Highland social structures. Gaelic participation in the war, it has been ar-
gued, was motivated by monarchism and deference to community leaders and
1776, of which around 2 million were white. Estimates of the loyalist population are 15–20 percent
of the white population, making a white loyalist population of around 400,000. Paul H. Smith has
estimated that 21,000 men served in the Provincial Corps, units raised from among the American
population. The Royal Highland Emigrants enlisted over 1,700 men ca. 1776–83, although not all
were ethnic Gaels. Significant numbers of Highlanders also served in Butler’s Rangers and the King’s
Royal Regiment of New York. A unit of almost 100 North Carolinian Highlanders was also raised in
1780, and there was a similar unit of Highlanders in New York City in 1778. This indicates, in
demographic and military terms, that Highlanders were massively disproportionately represented in the
loyalist population. For the figures, see Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970,
2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1975), 2:1168; Francis D. Cogliano, Revolutionary America, 1763–1815: A
Political History, 2nd ed. (Abingdon, 2009), 32; Robert V. Wells, “Population and Family in Early
America,” in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of the American Revolution, ed. Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole
(Oxford, 1991), 41; Robert M. Calhoon, “Loyalism and Neutrality,” in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia
of the American Revolution, 247; and Paul H. Smith, “The American Loyalists: Notes on Their Or-
ganisation and Numerical Strength,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 25, no. 2 (April 1968):
274; Smith’s figures do not include those who were actively loyal in other ways, serving in loyalist
militias or providing intelligence or supplies. According to the Loyalist Claims Commission, the number
of those who were “uniformed and zealous” was twice the number of those who bore arms in formed
regiments; see The National Archives (TNA), Kew, London, AO12/109, fol. 10.
5 Governor Josiah Martin estimated a potential fighting strength of 3,000 Highland Scots, which when
combined with populations estimates and tax lists for North Carolina (unfortunately, unreliable) suggests
an overall Highland population of 12,000. Allan MacDonald of Kingsburgh, husband of Flora MacDonald
and a major in the loyalist force, gave the figures as 1,200 Highlanders and 300 Regulators present at
Moore’s Creek, while Martin reported 600 Highlanders and 100 Regulators. For these population and
fighting estimates, see Scots Magazine (1772), xxxiv, 395, 515; Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony
of Allan MacDonald, TNA, AO13/87, fol. 59; and Governor Josiah Martin to George Germain, 21
March 1776, Wilmington, NC, in Documents of the American Revolution, ed. K. G. Davies, 21 vols.
(Dublin, 1979), 12:85–90.
6 William Legge, second earl of Dartmouth, to General William Howe, 15 September 1775, London,
TNA, CO5/92, fols. 491–94; Howe to Dartmouth, 15 January 1776, London, TNA, CO5/93, fol.
61.
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conditioned by the inherent social hierarchy of the clan structure.7 Duane Meyer’s
authoritative 1961 study of the Highland Scots in North Carolina was circum-
scribed by fundamental presumptions of Gaelic clannishness, an interpretation that
seems to color even recent scholarship, regardless of the details uncovered in
archival research.8 Two factors explain the continuing survival of outdated inter-
pretations of the Highland Scots in the New World. First, as incidental actors in
wider historical narratives, historians are less concerned with the inner workings
of eighteenth-century Highland society than with highlighting the conservative
and marginal nature of loyalism, a model to which the Highland Scots seem
perfectly suited. Second, and paradoxically, the success of Atlantic historiography
has created interpretive difficulties; Atlantic historians rightly ask the academic
profession to view continuity and change across a deeply interconnected region.
When such a view relies on a misreading of Old World contexts, however, it fails
to comprehend either continuity or change. Thus, one of the earliest and most
significant assertions of the utility of an Atlantic model for understanding eigh-
teenth-century Scotland, that of Eric Richards, was effective in detailing Scottish
sophistication as a whole but rested on a conservative reading of the Scottish Gael.
Change had been a root cause of emigration, and the Gaels’ experience of such
change shaped their reactions to the American War of Independence. Too often,
historians advocating the continuity of Scottish emigrants with Britain assert sim-
plistic notions of loyalty, conservatism, and deference in the Highland experience.9
Historiography has imposed a paradigm of continuity on Highland emigration by
grafting a generalized interpretation of the Scottish context onto emigrants’ co-
lonial experience. Falsely understood as a dispossessed minority, the Highland
emigrants emerged in this paradigm as uniform and simplistic characters whose
social experiences gave them little concept of the ideological underpinnings of the
Revolutionary conflict.10
This essay asserts an alternative view: Highland loyalism was a highly sophisti-
cated political action that reflected broadly positive views of the British Empire
7 Eugene Fingerhut, “Assimilation of Immigrants on the Frontier of New York, 1764–1776” (PhD
diss., Columbia University, 1962), 232; Wallace Brown, The King’s Friends: The Composition of the
American Loyalist Claimants (Providence, RI, 1965), 206; Christopher Moore, The Loyalists: Revo-
lution, Exile, Settlement (Toronto, 1984), 21; James Hunter, A Dance Called America (Edinburgh,
1994), 45; David Dobson, Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1604–1785 (Athens, GA, 1994),
140; Jenni Calder, Scots in the USA (Edinburgh, 2006), 77. The most recent scholarship has been
more sophisticated but still assumes certain ethnic factors in Highland loyalism; see Marianne McLean,
The People of Glengarry: Highlanders in Transition (Montreal, 1991), 87–92; Michael Fry, The Scottish
Empire (Edinburgh, 2001), 57–70; and T. M. Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 1600–1815 (London, 2003),
186.
8 Duane Meyer, The Highland Scots of North Carolina (Chapel Hill, NC, 1961), 4; Hugh Dussek,
“Pre-revolutionary History: Socio-religious Perspectives on the Scots-Irish and Highland Scots in the
Backcountry of North Carolina” (PhD diss., Union Institute, 2002).
9 Eric Richards, “Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic World,” in Strangers within the Realm:
Cultural Margins of the First British Empire, ed. Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan (London, 1991),
67–114. For the best example of an accurate perception of change through emigration, see McLean,
The People of Glengarry.
10 David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America (Oxford, 1989), 602;
George Rawlyk, “Loyalist Military Settlement in Upper Canada,” in The Loyal Americans: The Military
Role of the Loyalist Provincial Corps and their Settlement in British North America, 1775–1784, ed.
Robert S. Allen (Ottawa, 1983), 100.
LAND, LIBERTY, AND HIGHLAND LOYALISM  335
and its ability to safeguard liberty in the New World. The Highland emigrants’
loyalism was grounded in their experiences of a profound period of change in the
Highlands, as the region came to terms with the defeat of Jacobitism, the rise of
imperial hegemony, and the change from a mercantilist subsistence-based economy
to a less people-oriented obsession with commercial enterprise.11 Just as the Amer-
ican Revolution had its antecedents in the changing relationship between the
mother country and her colonies, so Highland loyalism was forged in changing
relationships. Many emigrants had previously attempted to test the commercial
modernization of Gaelic society in Scotland, but they had found its limits an
insufficient match for their aspirations. They arrived in America with credit, con-
tacts, and a desire to free themselves from the strictures of authoritarian land-
lordism. The Revolution politicized these aspirations when it posed a threat to
the established order of government in the colonies upon which the Highland
emigrants had pinned their interests. Change in political and socioeconomic
spheres, not cultural stasis, defined their loyalism.
In explaining the political actions of these people, it is necessary to establish
their broad conceptions of imperial expansion and its relationship to the Gael in
Scotland and America, which I undertake in the next section of this essay. Recent
work has demonstrated that loyalism helped shape the contours of the post-1783
British Empire.12 But perceptions of empire were just as important in the initial
formation of loyalism. The third section of this essay asserts that Highland identity
was increasingly immersed in a broader imperial culture, which recognized support
for the empire as the most rational approach to the pursuit of private and familial
interest. The fourth section of this essay outlines how that interest had been
fashioned principally by access to land, which Highlanders associated with liberty
and which was politicized through the imperial paradigm into loyalism. How
Highland views of liberty and property were subsumed into imperial attempts to
subdue the Jacobite rebellion proved to be the single most important factor in
the development of Highland loyalism and is the focal point of this study.13 The
Highland emigrant was not motivated, however, by a single factor. As loyalism
was predicated on political rather than ethnic affiliations, Highlanders possessed
conflicting aims, which conformed to their various material situations. These ex-
periences produced revolution and neutrality as well as loyalism.14 The fifth and
11 T. M. Devine, “A Conservative People? Scottish Gaeldom in the Age of Improvement,” 225–36,
esp. 233; Andrew MacKillop, “Highland Estate Change and Tenant Emigration,” 237–58, esp. 253,
both in Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives, ed. T. M Devine and J. R. Young (East Linton,
Scotland, 1999).
12 Maya Jasanoff, “The Other Side of Revolution: Loyalists in the British Empire,” William and
Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 65, no. 2 (April 2008): 205–32; Eliga H. Gould, “A Virtual Nation: Greater
Britain and the Imperial Legacy of the American Revolution,” American Historical Review 104, no.
2 (April 1999): 476–89.
13 For liberty and property, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New
York, 1993), 11–95.
14 For the political complexities of allegiance across the Atlantic region in this period, see Mary Beth
Norton, The British Americans: Loyalist Exiles in England (Boston, 1972); Carol Berkin, Jonathan Sewall:
Odyssey of an American Loyalist (London, 1974); John Ferling, The Loyalist Mind: Joseph Galloway and
the American Revolution (London, 1977); Janice Potter, The Liberty We Seek: Loyalist Ideology in Colonial
New York and Massachusetts (London, 1983); Ann Condon, “Marching to a Different Drummer: The
Political Philosophy of the Loyalists,” in Red, White and True Blue: The Loyalists in the Revolution, ed.
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final section of this essay assesses how, as the Revolutionary War progressed,
Highland loyalism fractured under the stress of fratricidal violence and the exposure
of the imperial administration as less than indomitable. Nevertheless, the dispro-
portionate loyalty of the Highland emigrants to the empire reveals the ability of
the imperial state to stimulate politically rational allegiances among its subjects.
The British state’s ability to include potentially disaffected groups (when expe-
diencies demanded a change in Westminster’s thinking) reveals a dynamic, decen-
tralized, and accommodating imperial administration. This, in turn, suggests a
broader significance to the role of imperial loyalism in the revolutionary narrative.
HIGHLAND POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1745–75
Highland identity within the British Empire was conflicted, but it needs to be
understood as part of the contextual background of loyalism. As the epicenter of
the last armed attempt to put a Stuart king back on the throne, the Highlands
dealt with a complicated set of political affiliations. The defeat of the Jacobite
movement at Culloden in 1746, and the brutal repression of the Highlands that
followed it, may have given many Highlanders an axe to grind. The apparent
paradox of Jacobites fighting for the Hanoverian government in America thirty
years after their defeat in 1746 has been characterized as a manifestation of the
Highlanders’ own recognition of their pacified, conquered, and colonized status.15
There is no reason, however, to believe that resistance to the Hanoverian settlement
was a constant feature of the Highland experience. It is of course true that much
of nascent British identity implicitly excluded the Highlanders; at its most Wilkite
odiousness, it was explicitly anti-Scottish in nature.16 Jacobitism had not, however,
commanded the instinctive and widespread support of the Highlands. As many
as three-fifths of the clans were divided, or neutral, or remained firmly attached
to the government. Anti-Jacobitism in the Highlands can be traced as far back as
Esmond Wright (New York, 1976), 1–18; John Sainsbury, Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of
Revolutionary America, 1769–1782 (Kingston, ON, 1987); Eliga H. Gould, Persistence of Empire: British
Political Culture in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC, 2000), 106–80; David Armitage,
“Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” The British Atlantic World, 1500–1800, ed. David Armitage and
Michael J. Braddick (Basingstoke, 2002), 11–30; Keith Mason, “The American Loyalist Diaspora and the
Reconfiguration of the British Atlantic World,” in Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the
Atlantic World, ed. Eliga H. Gould and Peter Onuf (London, 2005), 239–57; Bradley Jones, “The
American Revolution and Popular Loyalism in the British Atlantic World” (PhD diss., University of
Glasgow, 2006); and Edward Larkin, “What Is a Loyalist? The American Revolution as Civil War,”
Common-Place 8, no. 1 (2007), http://www.common-place.org/vol-08/no-01/larkin.
15 Meyer, Highland Scots, 4; Eric Richards, “Scotland and the Uses of the Atlantic World,” 106–8.
16 Commerce, the extension of empire, anti-French propaganda, and Protestantism have all been
forwarded, though by no means uncritically received, as the key ingredients of an embryonic sense of
Britishness; see Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation (London, 1992). For a critique of Protestant
identity in Britishness, see Tony Claydon and Ian McBride, introduction to Protestantism and National
Identity: Britain and Ireland, c. 1650–1850, ed. Tony Claydon and Ian McBride (Cambridge, 1999),
3–52. The Highlands were partly rejected from this identity because much of what defined the French
“other” in British identity was similarly applied to the Highlands; see Jonathan Hawkins, “Imperial
’45: The Jacobite Rebellions in Transatlantic Context,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
24, no. 1 (January 1996): 31–35; see also The Chevaliers Market; or, Highland Fair (London, 1745).
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Campbell support for the Covenanting movement in the seventeenth century.17
It is true that many former Jacobites were rehabilitated to fight for George III in
America during the Revolution, but fascination with these particular individuals
obscures the extent to which staunch Hanoverianism had long been an important
political currency in the Highlands. Captain Alexander MacDonald, who had be-
gun enlisting progovernment Highlanders in New York as early as 1774, had
originally been commissioned into the earl of Loudon’s independent companies
to oppose the Jacobites in Scotland in 1745. Allan MacDonald of Kingsburgh,
husband of the Jacobite heroine Flora MacDonald, had held a similar commission
during the Jacobite rebellion of 1745.18 Jacobitism, where it existed, was rarely
anti-imperial.19 This preexisting affiliation to Britain and the Hanoverian regime,
while never static or one-sided, was the setting for Highland conceptions of
Highland identity in the post-Culloden period.
Affiliation with Hanoverian Britain found expression in conscious assertions of
identity that were both Gaelic and pro-British—and considerably more complex
than might be assumed. Loyalty was not given solely to the crown but also to the
powerful authority of the British state as expressed by the constitution and through
the institution of Parliament. The British constitution was seen as the defender of
the Gael. Donnchadh Ba`n Mac an t-Saoir (1724–1812), one of the most brilliant
Gaelic poets of the period, expressed a Gaelic understanding of the constitutional
place of the king-in-Parliament: power emanated directly from the king, but it
was the combined legislature that was invested with sovereignty, enabling that
institution to secure peace and justice in the “four corners of the world.”20 Similarly,
Scotus Americanus was a pro-Revolutionary pamphleteer but, revealingly, drew upon
the values of the British constitution to promote emigration among Highland Scots.
In Information Concerning the Province of North Carolina Addressed to Emigrants
from the Highlands and Western Isles of Scotland (1773), he outlined how America
had inherited British values, free from the corrosive corruption of the metropolitan
center, noting that “here [in North Carolina] they [the Highland emigrants] still
17 Allan I. Macinnes, Clanship, Commerce and the House of Stuart, 1603–1788 (East Linton, Scotland,
1996), 249; Bob Harris, Politics and the Nation: Britain in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 2002),
150. It has also been shown that mismanagement of the Highlands, rather than any explicit hatred of
the Hanoverian regime, was vital in creating the preconditions of rebellion; see Rosalind Mitchison,
“The Government and the Highlands, 1707–1745,” in Scotland in the Age of Improvement, ed. N. T.
Phillipson and Rosalind Mitchison (Edinburgh, 1970), 39; and Colin Kidd, British Identities before
Nationalism: Ethnicity and Nationhood in the Atlantic World, 1600–1800 (Cambridge, 1999), 135.
18 Alexander MacDonald to Jeffrey Amherst, August 1777, Halifax, NS, in The Letterbook of Captain
Alexander MacDonald of the Royal Highland Emigrants, 1775–1779 (New York, 1883), 353–62. Allan
MacDonald of Kingsburgh had commanded a detachment of government troops in the Inner and
Outer Hebrides, in the very locality where his future wife would assist the prince in his famous escape;
see memorandum of Flora MacDonald, National Library of Scotland (NLS), MS 2618 Misc., fols. 82–
83.
19 For concepts of Britain in the poetry of Jacobite Gaels, see Vincent Morely, “The Idea of Britain
in Eighteenth Century Ireland and Scotland,” Studia Hibernica 33 (2004–5): 114–15.
20 Donnchadh Ba`n Mac an t-Saoir, “Oran do’n Righ,” in Orain Dhonnchaidh Bha`in [The songs of
Duncan Ban Macintyre], ed. and trans. Aonghas Macleoid (Edinburgh, 1978), 31; Macleoid’s work
provides the best translation of Mac an t-Saoir’s poetry, and I have used it here. And see James Macpherson,
The rights of Great Britain asserted against the claims of America: being an answer to the declaration of
the General Congress (London, 1776), 3–5; and “On Emigration from the Scottish Highlands and Isles,”
Relig Papers, NLS, MS 9646, fol. 65.
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belong to the British Empire, and are happy under the benign influence of its
administration. Here, at ease, they may enjoy all those civil blessings which the
noblest constitution under heaven was intended to communicate to all ranks be-
longing to it.”21
Loyalty was conditioned by an imperially situated reading of the Atlantic world.
Gaelic adherence to such abstractions as “the empire” might be traced to the
considerable diffusion of interest across the globe. Highland elites and merchants
operated in large networks, often with interrelated interests in timber, land, plan-
tations, and slaves, not all of which were located on the North American continent.
The safeguarding of these economic interests necessitated a rejection of political
separatism, particularly as the failed Jacobite rebellions had always precipitated
forfeitures and confiscations.22 Widespread economic interests prompted a fear of
dismemberment of the polity in which those interests were contained. As John
MacDonald of Glenalladale wrote, “He could not decline an example and exertion
of loyalty especially required by His majesty when the dismemberment of the
Empire was in question and especially the dismemberment of the part to which
the petitioner now belongs [North America].” The fear that the loss of one con-
stituent part was a threat to the whole had gained currency in debates on the
empire.23 Glenalladale even had the audacity to send to the American secretary in
1776 a forty-four-page memorandum on the future government of North America,
to protect the empire from further disintegration.24 For Highland loyalists, imperial
government was the foundation of a peaceful political space, one that provided
the conditions for socioeconomic stability. Thus when the Royal Standard was
raised at Cross Creek in February 1776, Brigadier General Donald MacDonald,
a loyalist, called on all subjects “to restore peace and tranquillity . . . to open again
the glorious streams of commerce—to partake of the blessings inseparable from
a regular administration of justice.”25
21 Scotus Americanus, Information Concerning the Province of North Carolina Addressed to Emigrants
from the Highlands and Western Isles of Scotland (Glasgow, 1773), 11, and see 7; Alexander Murdoch
has highlighted that the views expressed in the tract closely resembled those of Alexander Campbell
of Balole, a native of Islay who spent time in Jamaica, North Carolina, and the Highlands and maintained
a reputation for possessing information regarding emigration on both sides of the Atlantic. It is possible
that Balole and Scotus Americanus were one and the same; see Alexander Murdoch, “A Scottish
Document concerning Emigration to North Carolina in 1772,” North Carolina Historical Review 67,
no. 3 (July 1990): 444–45. For another work by Scotus Americanus (or, at least, an individual utilizing
the same pseudonym) advocating Highland support for the Revolution, see “To the emigrants lately
arrived from the Highlands of Scotland,” Virginia Gazette, no. 498 (23 November 1775), 1.
22 Daniel Ross to Munro Ross, 28 September 1780, Antigua, West Indies, National Archives of
Scotland (NAS), GD199/273; T. M. Devine, Clearance and Improvement: Land, Power and People in
Scotland, 1700–1900 (Edinburgh, 2006), 168; Bruce Lenman, “The Highland Aristocracy and North
America, 1603–1784,” in The Seventeenth Century in the Highlands, ed. Lachlan Maclean (Inverness,
1986), 172–85.
23 Allan M. MacDonald, “Captain John MacDonald ‘Glenalladale,’” Canadian Catholic Historical
Association Report 31 (1964): 29; Jones, “The American Revolution and Popular Loyalism,” 114; H. V.
Bowen, “British Conceptions of Global Empire, 1756–1783,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History 26, no. 3 (July 1996): 1, 15.
24 John Macdonald [of Glenalladale] to Lord Germain, 30 October 1776, Halifax, NS, TNA,
CO217/53, fols. 67–112.
25 John P. McLean, An Historical Account of the Settlement of Scotch Highlanders in America prior
to the Peace of 1783 (Glasgow, 1900), 126.
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An enhanced feeling of racial superiority was also a sign of increased connection
with the administration of empire. British officers dispatched to the Highlands as
early as the 1730s had noted the racial and linguistic superiority expressed by Gaels
toward their English counterparts, a contention borne out by subsequent Gaelic
literature.26 Within the empire, however, racial superiority was given new meaning,
as Highlanders became increasingly exposed to other minorities. There was an
assumption in the Highlands, as its inhabitants became fully fledged participants
in the imperial project, that the region belonged to a morally superior polity.
Writers increasingly made ethnically charged comments on the threat posed by
the French and the perceived duplicity of other European powers.27 This sense of
superiority was particularly important in the formation of loyalism. Some Highland
loyalists believed that the rebels were little more than “low lived rebellious rascals,”
“bandittie,” and “scoundrels,” whose actions could only be described as “bar-
barous.” Indeed, Highland perceptions of the loyal colonists were often little
better; the loyalist Highlander Alexander MacDonald had no wish to be compared
with the “rascally provincials among whom are to be found Numbers of Villains
& Thieves.”28 James MacLagan, a Gaelic scholar who served as a chaplain in
America during the war, saw in the “American character . . . a love of riches and
pleasures . . . litigiousness, deceit . . . [and] the Demon of ambition.” MacLagan
was engaging with British perceptions of the colonies and their peoples in a way
that demonstrates how preexisting identities were conditioning Highland re-
sponses to the imperial crisis.29 Earlier celebrations of Britain’s triumphs in the
Seven Years’ War over “foolish” enemies had not gone unnoticed in the Highlands:
Bha Ban-rı`gh Hungaraidh go`rach,
’Nuair a tho`isich i ri strı` ruit;
’S cha bu ghlice Righ na Spa`inte,
Tho`isich e gu da`na mı`omhail:
26 Edmund Burt, Letters from a Gentleman in the North of Scotland to his Friend in London, ed.
Andrew Simmons, 2 vols. (London, 1754; Edinburgh, 1998), 2:182; Alexander Macdonald, Ais-Eiridh
na Sean-Chanoin Albannaich; no, An nuadh oranaiche Gaidhealach (Edinburgh, 1751), 6–7.
27 Soldiering in India, 1764–1787: Extracts from Journals and Letters Left by Lt. Col. Allan Macpherson
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Ged a bha an dithis ud la`idir,
’S rı`gh no dha` a bh’anns na h-Innsean,
Fhuair thu dhuibh gach cu`is a dh’iarr thu,
’S tha na fiachan air an dı`oladh.
[The Hungarian Queen [Maria Theresa] was foolish, / When she began to struggle
against you; / No wiser was the king of Spain, / He boldly became unmannerly: /
Although those two were strong, / As a king or two were in India, / You got for
yourself each matter you demanded, / And the debts are all settled.]30
This poem in the medium of the Gaelic language reminds us, however, that
Highland loyalists were not unexceptional loyalists; they had a unique historical
experience of imperialism that provided distinct reasons for their support of the
imperial enterprise. For Highlanders, imperial success was essential, for it allowed
the Gael to celebrate military exploits, as they had traditionally done, in an en-
vironment in which Jacobitism could be ignored or molded to a new political
expedient. Removed from the domestic context of the post-Culloden Highlands,
Jacobitism could be represented as the prerequisite of the forging of the loyal
Highlander, with former rebelliousness actually making him better prepared to
undergo the hardships associated with imperial expansion. Michael Newton has
shown that the Gaelic panegyric code remained largely consistent during the period
and that the only substantial addition to poetic conventions when they were carried
over into an imperial sphere was the need to emphasize atonement for previous
displays of Jacobitism.31 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Gaelic poet gen-
erally served as a focal point for the communities’ ideals, and it was not until the
nineteenth century that the individualism of the Gaelic author became a significant
factor in poetry. Songs and poems were intended to be memorized, transmitted,
and critiqued orally. What has survived comes largely from eighteenth-century
publications in Gaelic, some of which had popular appeal, with print runs of over
a thousand copies. In this light, poetry represents an effective, if not straightfor-
ward, source for gleaning Gaelic perceptions of political ideas.32 Imperial military
service reinforced a fundamental Gaelic assumption of martial superiority. British
triumphs were articulated as proof of such assumptions:
’An America thuathach,
’Stric a tharraing e` cruaidh-lann,
’S bha na Friosalaich chuannta,
’S iad fo’ smachd mar bu dua`llach,
Ealamh acuinneach ruanach,
’S ı`ad a leanadh an ruaig gun bhi sgı`th.
30 Mac an t-Saoir, “Oran Do’n Righ,” in Orain Dhonnchaidh Bha`in, 31, Macleoid’s translation.
31 Kenneth Mackenzie, Orain Ghaidhealach agus Bearla air an eadar-theangacha (Edinburgh, 1792),
37–42; Michael Newton, “Jacobite Past, Loyalist Present,” Journal of Interdisciplinary Celtic Studies
5 (2003): 58.
32 See Wilson McLeod, “Gaelic Poetry as Historical Source: Some Problems and Possibilities,” in
Ireland (Ulster) Scotland; Concepts, Contexts, Comparisons, ed. Edna Longley, Eamonn Hughes, and
Des O’Rawe (Belfast, 2003), 171–73.
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[In North America, / Frequently did he draw heavy swords, / The Frasers [71st
Foot] were of good conduct, / And under his control as was their custom, / Swift,
well-equipped and fierce, / They would never tire of the pursuit.]33
The response of Gaelic poetry to the British Empire reveals a confidence entirely
ignored by English-language scholars in favor of reductive presumptions of de-
featism. This confidence was predicated on the violence-imbued celebration of
martial strength. One poem from the era describes how soldiers in the Continental
army, provided they fought in the open, would be left so that: “Chan fhaighte
mac duin’ air aon tulaich gu feum, / Ach ’n ca`rnaibh air chomhnard a’ foghlum
an e`ig” [No man on any hillock would be of use, / He would instead be lying
in heaps of the dead].34 Gaelic conceptions of the empire were operating on a
more complex level, however, and were formulated well in advance of the American
rebellion. James MacLagan implicitly suggested a kind of Pax Britannica as early
as 1756. The defeat of the French in North America, he said, would usher in a
wonderful peace:
’N sin gabhaidh croabh na sı`th le freamh,
Teann ghream do ’n doimhne thalmhainn;
Is sı`nsidh geuga gu rig Ne`amh,
Gach a`ird le feamh-mheas ’s geal-bhath;
Bithidh ceiler e`ibhinn eun na meaghlan,
’S daoine le’n clainn ag fealbhachadh;
Toradh is saoth’r an la`mh gun mhaoim,
Faoi dhubhar caomh a sga`ilsi sga`ilsin.
[Then the roots of the tree of peace will, / Take a hold of the earth’s depths; / And
its branches will stretch to Heaven, / Every height with delicate fruits and white
blossoms. / The melody of birds in its branches, / Families taking residence, / The
produce of their hands unfailing, / Under the follicle’s proven splendor.]35
Thus, Gaelic imperatives remained central. By recognizing the imperial domin-
ion and success of the empire, however, Gaels strengthened the contextual setting
in which these interests flourished. This did not necessarily forge loyalism in an
abstract form; it did create an association between Gaelic interest and imperial
dominion. For these reasons, fear and marginality have been overstated as the
reasons why Highlanders turned to loyalism.36 Minorities such as the Gaels, French-
33 “Oran do Choirneal Mac’Phearson,” in Mackenzie, Orain Ghaidhealach agus Bearla, 40, my
translation; this song was for Duncan Macpherson, who commanded the 71st Foot at Yorktown in
1781 and who was known as Donnacha na h’Ath (Duncan of the Kiln), having been born in a kiln
while his father, Ewan Macpherson of Cluny, was on the run from government forces after the 1745
Jacobite rebellion.
34 Quoted from Duncan Kennedy, “A Song after the Revolution,” a contemporary poem, in Newton,
We’re Indians Sure Enough, 159, Newton’s translation.
35 James MacLagan, “Oran a rinneadh d’an chath bhuidhinn Rioghail Ghaoidheallach nuair bha iad
dol d’American san bhliadhna 1756,” in John Gillies, Sean Dain agus Orain Ghaidhealach, do Reir
Ordu’ Dhoin Uaisle a Raid an Gaeltachd Alba (Perth, 1786), 115–16, my translation.
36 William H. Nelson, The American Tory (Oxford, 1961), 86–90; Wallace Brown, The Good Amer-
icans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York, 1969), 47; Potter, The Liberty We Seek, 12;
Hunter, Dance Called America, 45; Devine, Scotland’s Empire, 183.
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speaking Canadians, indigenous nations, and enslaved Africans all had something
to fear from the loss of British control, as such a loss would leave them at the
mercy of the less tolerant Revolutionary authorities. Significantly, it was a High-
lander, Adam Ferguson (1725–1816), who explained that the psychological forces
that bound communities consisted as much in opposition to an external “other”
as in any internal affection.37 Gaels could have been only too well aware that
elements of colonial society were infected by an utter detestation of Scots. Colonial
political consciousness was formed largely through English publications, which
often held Scots in disdain and portrayed them as unabashed supporters of the
royal prerogative. For colonial patriots, the Scots were “the contrivers and sup-
porters of all measures against you [Congress]. Nor will they ever desist while the
English have a penny to be plundered or a man sacrificed.”38 Graphic satires, such
as the single-sheet pictorial representation The Scotch Butchery (1775), conveyed
to colonists the treatment that places such as Boston were likely to receive from
Highland soldiers once they were deployed there, behavior so shocking that even
English troops would be forced to avert their gaze. Colonists had little difficulty
in seeing the Highlanders as “cannibals” and equating them with other “savages,”
a category that included both Native Americans and enslaved Africans.39
Yet accepting fear alone as a reason for loyalism fails to account for regional
variation in responses within the colonies. Anti-Scots sentiment was strong in
Virginia, for example, where the Scots held a virtual monopoly of the tobacco
trade and debt to Scottish merchants was a bitter undercurrent of revolution. By
contrast, in sparsely populated colonies, where Highland loyalism was strongest,
there had been encouraging signs for the Highland immigrants and broadly positive
views of the potential for Highlanders to bring areas into civility and commerce.
Tax exemptions and the voting of public funds to support Highland settlement
had passed during the governorship of Gabriel Johnstone (1734–52) in North
Carolina. Land grants of up to 640 acres were awarded to Highlanders in North
Carolina’s Cumberland County in 691 instances between 1732 and 1775.40
Highland settlements were not segregated communities, set apart from other col-
onists, but vibrant, commercial societies. By the 1770s, backcountry settlers could
obtain most of their necessities from the Highland settlement of Cross Creek,
reducing the need for travel to Charleston. Slaveholding was an active part of
Highland settler life in the colonies and helped make Cross Creek a commercially
vibrant settlement. It was also, largely as a result of its increasing role as a com-
mercial hub, a politically dynamic community. In 1765, Cross Creek had been
the site of anti–Stamp Acts protests, in which the town’s residents had burned an
effigy of the stamp officer. During these troubles, Andrew Stewart, a Highland
resident of Cross Creek, lost his commission as “His Majesty’s printer for this
37 Adam Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society (Edinburgh, 1767), 23–24.
38 Arthur Lee to the Committee of Secret Correspondence, 3 June 1776, London, in The Revolu-
tionary Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, ed. Francis Wharton, 6 vols. (Washington, DC,
1889), 2:95–96; Michael Duffy, The Englishman and the Foreigner (Cambridge, 1986), esp. 19–20.
39 The Scotch Butchery (London, 1775); “About the use of Savages Against the Americans,” in State
Records of North Carolina, ed. Walter Clark, 16 vols. (Raleigh, NC, 1886–1914), 10:714; McAlpine,
Genuine Narratives, 43.
40 Jeffrey Amherst to Henry Bouquet, 7 August 1763, New York, British Library, London, Add.
MS 21634, fol. 347; Meyer, Highland Scots, 89.
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province” for printing an anonymous letter in the North Carolina Gazette, which
had been advocating the use of force against the king’s forces.41 In this tense
political climate, allegiances were determined by political, social, and economic
factors rather than by ethnicity. Highland Scots did not make up the majority of
the population even in Cumberland County, but this seems to have played little
part in the political discourse of Highland settlers. Instead, concerns about political
representation or infrastructure tended to occupy the minds of Highland com-
munity leaders. It is not surprising, then, that contemporaries did not seem to
take the alleged toryism of the Highlanders as a given. In August 1775, the
Provincial Congress of North Carolina appointed a twelve-man committee, which
included Highland members of the Provincial Congress, to explain to the recent
arrivals “the Nature of Our Unhappy controversy with Great Britain.” The Con-
tinental Congress in Philadelphia soon followed suit. By October 1775, the loyalist
governor of North Carolina, Josiah Martin, feared for his own position when he
was informed that many had “declared themselves for neutrality.”42
The Mohawk Valley of New York was also in the process of political integration
but with markedly different results. There had been early emigration from Ar-
gyllshire to the colony in 1739 and 1764, but the “Argyle Patent” was a consid-
erable distance from the valley where, in 1773–74, some sixty-seven Highland
families settled on lands owned by Sir William Johnson.43 For these recent arrivals,
integration necessitated a modicum of allegiance to Johnson, the most powerful
landowner (and imperial presence) in the area. No attempt was made, however,
to replicate semifeudal structures, and Johnson’s papers indicate that the emigrants
were proactive in making the relationship an economic rather than a personal one.
To Johnson’s frustration, they made stringent demands on him as a prerequisite
of their settlement.44 After William Johnston died, in July 1774, the Highlanders
allied with his son, John Johnson, in order to safeguard the advantageous economic
relationship. The embryonic nature of political institutions in upper New York
had resulted in a relatively unsophisticated relationship between these new settlers
and the Johnsons, although that relationship was a clear mark of the settlers’
determination to forge new colonial-based networks for material security.
Highlanders did not become loyalists simply because they were considered cul-
tural outsiders in the colonies. Rather, their understanding of themselves as Britons
within the British Empire ensured their resistance to arguments from the American
Revolutionaries. If the Highlanders’ British and imperial identity had not been
41 Meyer, Highland Scots, 108–11, 133–34.
42 “The Journal of the Proceedings of the Provincial Congress of North Carolina, held at
Hillsborough 20th August A.D. 1775,” in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 10:173–74;
Martin to the earl of Dartmouth, 16 October 1775, on board a sloop of war in the Cape Fear
River, ibid., 10:266. For evidence of good relations between Highland settlers and revolutionary
governments, see “Proceedings of Virginia Convention at Williamsburg in the matter of certain
Scotch immigrants en route to North Carolina,” ibid., 10:346; Thomas Burke to the General
Assembly of North Carolina,” 16 April 1782, Halifax, NS, ibid., 16:13; and MacDonald to
Mr Walter, 4 November 1775, Halifax, NS, in Letterbook of Captain Alexander MacDonald.
43 Robert McGeachy, “Captain Lauchlin Campbell and Early Argyllshire Emigration to New York,”
Northern Scotland 19 (1999): 21–46; Governor Tyron to the second earl of Dartmouth, 2 November
1773, New York, TNA, CO5/1078, fols. 15–16.
44 James Sullivan, ed., The Papers of Sir William Johnson, 14 vols. (Albany, NY, 1921–30), 8:915–
17, 12:1111–12.
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firmly fixed by that time, they would not have been able to articulate their ob-
jections to Revolutionary authority.
LOYALISM AND INTEREST
With the prerequisites of the post-Culloden Highlanders in place, let us now
examine how Highland interest was politicized into loyalism. The origins of this
process lay in the exploitation of empire for material and social gain. The second
half of the eighteenth century saw the widespread co-option of the fiscal-military
state, and its public revenue, by interested groups and individuals. These peo-
ple—in the Highland case, mostly army officers—benefited from the burgeoning
commitments of empire and from the public purse that funded it. While these
benefits could be inconsistent, some Highlanders accrued enormous wealth and
privilege to satisfy their personal and familial interests.45 The global extent of these
benefits is revealed by the range of imperial posts and positions, which underpinned
British expansion taken up by Highland Scots. Lachlan McGillivray (1718–99)
was a successful fur trader and planter in Georgia who, through marriage into a
mixed French/Creek elite of the Coushatta Clan, became the father of a son,
Alexander (1750–93). After the death of Chief Emistigo during a raid in 1782,
Alexander led the Upper Creek Nation during the late Revolutionary and early
Republican eras. John Campbell, fourth earl of Loudon (1705–82), took command
of British forces in North America from William Shirley in 1756. James Mac-
pherson (1736–96), author of the controversial Ossian poems, served briefly as a
secretary to Governor George Johnston of Florida and wrote several tracts in
defense of Lord North’s ministry. In 1780, Macpherson became an MP for Cam-
elford, his wide imperial connections most obvious in his appointment to the post
of London agent to the Nabob of Arcot. Recent scholarship has shown the extent
to which East India Company patronage was used for the political management
of Scottish elites, including active and potential Jacobites. There is little doubt of
the increasing influence of Highland Scots in the corridors of power in Georgian
Britain. Men with vested interests in the Highlands were beginning to coalesce
into an influential group of lobbyists, culminating in the formation of the Highland
Society of London in 1778.46
45 P. J. Marshall, “Empire and Opportunity in Britain, 1763–75,” 1995 Prothero Lecture, Trans-
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46 Edward J. Cashin, Lachlan McGillivray, Indian Trader: The Shaping of the Southern Colonial
Frontier (Athens, GA, 1992); J. Russell Snapp, John Stuart and the Struggle for Empire on the Southern
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It was in the military that Highlanders achieved their greatest imperial and global
importance. During the Seven Years’ War, as well as in the years immediately
following, Highlanders in the king’s service were exposed to a massive territorial
empire, with profound effect. Nine battalions of infantry had been raised in the
Highlands during the Seven Years’ War; four of those battalions were deployed
to North America, two to Germany, and three to India or as home deployments.
Sir Archibald Campbell, made famous by his command of British forces in Georgia
colony in 1778–79, had experience of a global empire, having fought in the West
Indies during the Seven Years’ War and in India in the 1760s and early 1770s.
Allan McLean of Torloisk, colonel of the loyalist regiment the Royal Highland
Emigrants, had spent much of the 1760s and 1770s recruiting for the East India
Company.47 The preponderance of Highlanders in the army was exceptional. Be-
tween 1756 and 1783, at least nineteen regular Highland battalions were raised,
in addition to several loyalist regiments and units for home defense. A conservative
estimate based on these figures would suggest that one in eight members of the
eligible male population of the Highlands served in the army at some time during
the period. This ratio is comparable to available data for the British Isles as a whole
between 1775 and 1783; those figures, however, include naval enlistments (larger
than the army by one-third), as well as volunteer and militia units, which were
more numerous, and more accepted in England and Ireland, than in Scotland. If
we were to compare enlistment in the regular army alone, we would find that
during the American War of Independence, around one in twenty-eight eligible
males in the British Isles served; the figure for the Highlanders’ enlistment during
both imperial wars was at least one in eight.48 Such was the extent of Highland
elite involvement in the military that lack of diversification in the employment of
some families proved utterly ruinous of their finances.49
The explanation for the Highlanders’ disproportionate enlistment lay in the
structural foundations of Highland military emigration and the ideological im-
and the British State: The Scottish Elite and Politics in the Eighteenth Century (London, 2008); Donald
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commencement of the year 1813 (London, 1813), 1–12.
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Archibald Campbell Esquire Lieut. Colol. Of His Majesty’s 71st Regimt., 1778, ed. Colin Campbell
(Darien, GA., 1981), i–v.
48 These figures are based on a Highland population of 275,000, of which one-quarter were eligible
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peratives of Highland military service. Military emigration had been a major facet
of the political economy of the Highlands since at least the Middle Ages, and
service in foreign armies remained important until the 1750s.50 Unique, however,
was the centrality of military service to private economic security. Prior to the
collapse of clanship in the Highlands, men had pledged their military service to
a chief in return for economic security and protection from famine and starvation.
The end of clanship as a viable form of communal organization did not sever the
connection between military service and familial security. This was reinforced in
the post-Culloden Highlands as landed elites invested increasing energies into
military recruitment, underpinning the role of the army as a logical guarantor of
private interest. Army officers recruiting in the Highlands did experience problems
in meeting quotas for enlistment. Such problems arose not from Highlanders’
resistance to military service but, rather, from their desire to safeguard their own
private interests and, given the landed elites’ need for men to fill the ranks, ne-
gotiate a higher price for their military labor.51
Land was a vital measure of the value of military service. Land was invested
with huge importance in the rural economy of the Highlands: it was the main
form of property and thus central to the Highlanders’ economic security.52 In the
aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, local elites and the imperial state intensified
the attractiveness of military service and security by promising land upon enlistment
and by settling demobilized soldiers on land grants in Quebec and New York
under the auspices of the King’s Proclamation of 7 October 1763. Around 170
Highland veterans of the 78th Foot alone were settled in the colonies, including
over 70 percent of the regiment’s cadre of noncommissioned officers.53 By 1775,
a link had been forged between imperial political ends and preestablished ideas
among Highland males of how to achieve economic security through military
service in the army. How this was reinforced in the initial stages of the American
Revolution may be seen in a recruitment poster for the 71st Foot from 1776:
They [the 71st] are to go to America, and by his Majesty’s royal and most gracious
proclamation, they will be entitled to a full discharge at the end of three years, that
is in 1779 or of the present American rebellion[.] . . . It cannot in all human probability,
fail to be entirely quelled, next summer. Then, gentlemen will be your harvest, and
the best one you ever cropt. You will each of you, by visiting this New World become
the founders of families. The lands of the rebels will be divided amongst you, and
everyone of you become lairds.54
50 Stephen Conway, “Scots, Britons and Europeans: Scottish Military Service, c. 1739–1783,”
Historical Research 82 (February 2009): 114–30; John Marsden, Galloglas: Hebridean and West
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This should not suggest, however, that Highland military service was confined
to a traditional localist model; rather, it was increasingly immersed in a broader
imperial culture as soldiers recognized the potential for economic security through
land grants in colonial North America. Writing about the Highland soldiers who
had fought in North America in the 1760s, Scotus Americanus commented, “It
would seem as if they had made such important conquests in that quarter of the
globe, in order to secure for themselves, and their countrymen, an agreeable and
happy retreat, and a large fertile field for them . . . to flourish in.”55 This was
important, as access to colonial land increased at a time when the economic plight
of Highland tenants in Scotland was severely deteriorating. But this was not a
simplistic story of increased rents, enforced on a languid and unified tenantry by
villainous landlords. Greater economic opportunities and rising rents promoted
dissension between tenant groups, the upper tenantry extending their economic
hold over the lower orders as it passed rents on down the social ladder. Paradox-
ically, it was middling tenants who had responded best to these changes—by
becoming leaders in the cattle trade—but who then were forced to emigrate when
prices fell in the 1770s.56
Rising rents and the renters’ inability fully to pursue commercial possibilities
within the strictures of Highland society made imperial settlement opportunities
through the offer of colonial land in exchange for military service increasingly
inviting. For middling Highlanders affected by financial instability, the colonies
became part of an aspirational ideal. Rural Highlanders conceptualized North
America as a land of liberty because it was associated with freedom from the
arbitrary power of landowners. Direct ownership of land would, it was thought,
safeguard families from any future inability to meet rising rents. The equation of
land and liberty was widespread in the British Atlantic world, but the precise
meaning of this notion depended on the particular historical experiences of those
who held it. The deterioration of political and economic conditions in the High-
lands led Gaels to understand liberty primarily in terms of the ownership of prop-
erty. These emigrants did not have the experience of English common law in which
property was explicitly understood as a bulwark against tyranny; however, the
frustrations of rack-renting—in some areas, rents rose 300–400 percent between
1750 and 1800—convinced upwardly mobile Highlanders of the benefits of full
ownership of property. In 1772, Alexander McAllister wrote from North Carolina
that in that colony, “we breathe the air of liberty, we have no rents.” For McAllister,
America was a door opened by God for the poor of the Highlands. One observer
noted how Highland emigrants leaving Scotland “launched out into a new world
breathing a spirit of liberty and a desire of every individual becoming a proprietor.”
Duncan Lothian considered these issues in “A Song for America,” published in
1780:
55 Scotus Americanus, Information Concerning the Province of North Carolina, 10.
56 Malcolm Gray, The Highland Economy, 1750–1850 (Edinburgh, 1957), 23; T. M. Devine, Clanship
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Tha h-uile neach chaidh null;
Toirt cunntas math nas leor air;
On gheibh iad fearann soar ann;
Chan fhan ach daoine gorach.
[Every person who has gone over yonder; / Gives a favorable report of it; / Since
they can get cheap land there; / No one but fools will stay here.]57
This change in the significance of land reinforced Highland loyalism by prompt-
ing a political redefinition of property. In their equation of liberty with freedom
from the tyranny of landowning elites, Highlanders’ conceptions of liberty were
necessarily negative ones, if we divide notions of liberty by the polarity suggested
by Isaiah Berlin in the 1950s: Highland emigrants demanded the absence of con-
straint and the freedom to be left in relative peace.58 Free land provided the physical
space in which sociopolitical and economic constraint could not materialize. Land
was therefore perfectly suited to negative conceptions of liberty and, as such,
reinforced an imperial reading of the Revolutionary conflict. As most Highlanders
sought negative liberties, they did not claim rights as Englishmen, a positive approach
to liberty favored by American Whigs. Instead, they expressed their rights by seeking
the free ownership of land. In this reading, an imperial balance was maintained
between government and individuals, and between periphery and center, in which
all were protected from tyranny and arbitrary authority. By demanding positive self-
mastery and rational control over their political destinies, the Revolutionaries
launched a direct attack upon this assumed uniformity of their rights as Englishmen;
they also undermined the constitutional order that had created this balance. Ad-
herence to negative conceptions of liberty necessarily brought the Highlanders into
more direct conflict with Revolutionary authorities, who demanded more concrete
expressions of obligation through the administering of patriotic oaths or forcible
enlistment in patriot militias. These impositions, so contrary to negative freedoms,
were later cited by loyalists as a major cause of their resistance. Helen Macdonnell,
the wife of the prominent New York loyalist Allan Macdonnell of Collachie, summed
up Highland imperatives when she assured patriot commanders that although ag-
gression would be met with equal violence, her fellow Highlanders had “not done
anything against the country, nor intend to, if let alone.”59
57 Mackillop, “The Highlands and the Returning Nabob,” 250; Angus McCuiag to Alexander Mc-
Allister, August 1770; Alexander McAllister to John Boyd, November 1770; James McAllister to Al-
exander McAllister, October 1771; Alexander McAllister to Mary McAllister (undated [1772?]), all
written between Cross Creek and Argyllshire, Scotland—no specific locations given, all in McAllister
Papers, North Carolina State Archives (NCSA), Raleigh, NC; Commissioners of Customs, Fort William,
to the Treasury in London, 18 July 1785, Treasury Papers, TNA, T1/624, fols. 107–9; Duncan Lothian,
“Oran America” [A song for America], in A Collection of Gaelic and English Songs (Aberdeen, 1780),
22, my translation; and see “Observes or Remarks upon the lands and islands which compose the
barony called Harris,” Lee Papers, NLS, MS 3431, fol. 80.
58 For definitions of positive and negative liberty, see Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty: An Inaugural
Lecture Delivered before the University of Oxford on 31 October 1958 (Oxford, 1958); see also J. C. D.
Clark, “Liberty and Religion: The End of U.S. Exceptionalism?” Orbis 49, no. 1 (2005): 21–35.
59 Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of Donald Morrison, TNA, AO12/34, fol. 357; McLean,
An Historical Account, 211.
LAND, LIBERTY, AND HIGHLAND LOYALISM  349
Highland loyalism was relatively strong in the initial phase of the Revolutionary
War because previous military service in the Seven Years’ War had secured land
for Highland soldiers, and there was every reason to assume in 1775 that this
outcome would be repeated. For recently arrived Highlanders entirely receptive
to the view that the imperial state was unconquerable and that it was only through
imperial dominion that they had “been enabled to visit this western region,” the
idea of defeat was incomprehensible. Recruiting officers deliberately cultivated the
idea that the new war would soon be won, and they placed definitive restrictions
on the period of service in Highland and Highland loyalist regiments; few High-
landers believed they would be required to serve more than three years before
being entitled to land. As late as 1777, Highland officers were still making plans
to bring their families to the colonies, presuming the “rebellion” would soon be
over. The idea that the “Yankies [sic]” would soon give up the rebellion and that
“the Congress and leaders of rebellion will be sent home to take their fate at
Tyburn” was a common one. It took one Highland loyalist officer until late 1777
to realize that the landed rewards might never be forthcoming. Even then, he still
placed his faith in a negotiated settlement that would allow him to return to his
Staten Island farm.60 For a colonial region with decades of reciprocal relations
with the imperial state and, indeed, for individuals with personal experience of the
material benefits of service, the idea that Revolutionary authorities could satisfy
Highland interests could not possibly have developed in the short years between
the Highlanders’ arrival in the colonies and the mobilization of Revolutionary
militias against Highland settlements in North Carolina and New York in early
1776. As Donnchadh Ban Mac an t-Saoir had expressed as early as 1767:
Bidh sinn uil’ aig Rı`gh Deo`rsa;
’S cha gho`raiche dhuinn;
O’s ann aige tha ’n sto`ras;
Is co`ir air a’ Chru`n;
Bheir e ’m pa`igheadh ’nar do`rn duinn.
[We will all serve King George; / And we are not foolish for it; / For he is the one
with the provisions; / And right to the Crown; / He will give payment to us.]61
LAND AND THE REVOLUTIONARY CONFLICT
The concern over land underpinned Highland support for imperial vitality during
the Revolutionary War, demonstrating the considerable linkage between individual
private interest and political allegiance. This link, however, was particular to the
North American colonies in the 1770s. Land, for example, was rarely, if ever, used
60 General Donald Macdonald to James Moore, 20 February 1776, Camp at Rockfish, NC, in Clark,
State Records of North Carolina, 11:278–79; 8 January 1776, NMS, M.1982.97; MacDonald to J.
Ogilvie, 24 April 1775, Halifax, NS, and MacDonald to [addressee unknown], 21 August 1777, Halifax,
NS, both in Letterbook of Captain Alexander MacDonald, 159, 321; John Grant to Sir James Grant
of Grant, 26 June 1777, New York, NAS, GD248/54/4/60.
61 Mac an t-Saoir, “Oran Do Thailbeart,” in Orain Dhonnchaidh Bha`in, 23, Macleoid’s translation.
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in other constituent parts of the British Empire in securing the attachment of
people to the crown. In India, no land settlement policy was initiated, and it was
not until 1779 that land began to be offered to sepoys in return for their service;
it had, incidentally, very few takers among the Indian troops. But in India, high
levels of taxation, surplus populations, and a belief in the suitability of Indians as
cultivators of the soil indicated that there was little need for a change to the status
quo. North America was different. A sparse population of European emigrants,
vulnerable frontiers, and limited returns on uncultivated land led directly to the
provision of lands to secure economic and political stability.62
British policy during the Revolutionary War gave credence to the established
notion that colonial discord provided opportunities. Governor Martin of North
Carolina was quick to realize that the provision of land attached Highland emi-
grants to the imperial government. A month before the outbreak of hostilities, he
had informed the American secretary, the second earl of Dartmouth, that, despite
attempts to prevent their doing so, recently arrived Highlanders had begun squat-
ting on royal lands. As the crisis deepened, and in order to limit the numbers of
colonists, the British administration took the decision to close the land offices, an
act that prevented newly arrived emigrants’ gaining access to land through official
means. Martin also reported that those Highlanders who had fought against the
Regulators, a movement of western settlers who staged an uprising against the
corrupt North Carolina political establishment, at the Battle of Almanace in 1771,
had been questioning him about whether the King’s Proclamation of 1763, which
had provided lands to veterans of the Seven Years’ War, extended to their own
military service.63 By November 1776, Martin had grown in confidence and de-
tailed how, in the absence of the land office, he had begun to implement a land
policy for a group of Highlanders who had arrived on 21 October of that year:
I was induced to Grant their request [for land] on the Terms of their taking such
lands in the proportions allowed by his majesty’s royal instructions . . . thinking it
more advisable to attach these people to government by granting as matter of favour
and courtesy to them what I had not power to prevent than to leave them to possess
themselves by violence . . . as it was not only the means of securing these people
against the seditions of the rebels . . . I think my lord, with submission, that the
expediency of making some rule of favour and indulgence in granting lands to these
emigrants . . . may be worth his majesty’s royal consideration.64
As Martin’s correspondence reveals, Highlanders residing at Cross Creek had
already used their service against the Regulators as a justification for providing
themselves with the freedom that accompanied the possession of land. Martin
clearly believed that these land grants were “the sure means of restoring and
62 Channa Wickremesekera, “Best Black Troops in the World”: British Perceptions and the Making of
the Sepoy, 1745–1805 (New Delhi, 2002), 129; Marshall, “Empire and Opportunity in Britain, 1763–
75,” 13, 20.
63 Martin to Dartmouth, 10 March 1775, Wilmington, NC, in Davies, Documents of the American
Revolution, 10:56.
64 Martin to Dartmouth, 12 November 1776, on board a sloop of war in the Cape Fear River, in
Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 10:324, and see 10:324–28.
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establishing the good dispositions of the large body of their countrymen.”65 He
was not alone. On 10 August 1775, the Quebec Gazette had carried a notice that
stated that enlistees in the new Royal Highland Emigrant Regiment would be
rewarded with land, amounting to 200 acres for each private soldier. The size of
these land grants was graded according to the rank of the soldier and rose to
5,000 acres for field officers. This compared favorably to the land settlements on
which other provincial units were being raised. Privates serving in the Royal
Highland Emigrants could expect to receive double the land allowance granted
to their fellow loyalists. This was also a better offer than had resulted from the
King’s Proclamation of 1763, upon which Highland veterans had been settled at
the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War. In addition to the obvious numerical
differences, the terms granted to the soldiers of the Royal Highland Emigrants
were unique in that they stipulated a very precise theater of operations and very
precise terms of enlistment. Furthermore, their terms promised that those lands
would be given to the soldiers before they had completed their military service;
in effect, the limited obligations that were associated with this entitlement to land
were stated explicitly.66
The importance of these inducements can be seen in the accounts of Highland
loyalists. John McAlpine did not enlist in any loyalist regiment, but he wrote to
General Carleton that “should my sovereign . . . be pleased to grant me some
rebels farm at the conclusion of this war . . . we would accept it with gratitude.”
Other Highland loyalists achieved similar objectives. Nile McLean, a piper in the
Royal Highland Emigrants, informed his father that “I and my family enjoys a
good state of Health” and that his cousin and brother had already been discharged
and had settled near New York. A fellow piper in the 71st Foot noted that “I am
as well as ever I was in my life . . . and I hope my fortune within two years will
be as good that I will have 200 acres of free ground of my own in this country.”67
Until almost the end of the war, Highland emigrants were plied with land settle-
ments in return for enlistment. For instance, when Charles, Lord Cornwallis,
65 Martin to Dartmouth, 16 October 1775, on board a sloop of war in the Cape Fear River, ibid.,
10:267–68, and see 264–79.
66 George Patterson, “The 84th Foot or Royal Highland Emigrants,” in More Studies in Nova Scotian
History (Halifax, NS, 1941), 12; MacDonald to William Howe, 30 November 1775, Halifax, NS, in
Letterbook of Captain Alexander MacDonald, 224; “Brid. Gen. Allan Maclean,” app. 21, in Hadden’s
Journal and Orderly Books: A Journal Kept in Canada and upon Burgoyne’s Campaign in 1776 and
1777, by Lieut. James M. Hadden, Royal Artillery, ed. Horatio Rogers (Boston, 1972), 549–50. The
corresponding figure for other loyalists was 100 acres per private, with the difference between Emigrant
officers’ and other loyalist officers’ land grants diverging at increased rates the higher the rank of the
officer. The vast majority of loyalists would not receive this amount of land until 1788. The corre-
sponding figure for the King’s Proclamation was 50 acres per private rising to 4,000 acres per field
officer. It is probable that these numbers were inflated for the purposes of recruitment, for it was not
until April 1777 that the king officially authorized Torloisk to grant lands but to do so on the basis
of the 1763 Proclamation; see Paul H. Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary
Policy (Chapel Hill, NC, 1964), 67.
67 McAlpine, Genuine Narratives, 15, 45; Nile Mclean to his father, 2 September 1782, Halifax,
NS, NAS, GD174/1348; William Mackenzie to Peter [surname unknown], 7 February 1778, New
York, NAS, GD170/3158.
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commanding British forces in the southern colonies, met with the Highlanders at
Cross Creek in 1781, he offered land to induce them to enlist.68
Private William MacDonald fought in North America during the Seven Years’
War and settled in Nova Scotia in 1763 under the provisions of the King’s Proc-
lamation. In 1777–78, he bought out nine other 50-acre grants that had been
awarded to Highland veterans in the Shubenacadie River Valley. While awaiting
confirmation of these purchases by Governor Charles Morris, MacDonald chose
to enlist in the Royal Highland Emigrants. Service in the Revolutionary War
provided him with a further 300 acres, which he received in 1783, giving Mac-
Donald 800 acres of land. He then purchased sheep, cattle, and adjoining land
and granted 400 acres to his sons James and Andrew. By 1794, on the basis of
his military service in two wars, MacDonald had become a landowning entrepre-
neur, established an estate of 1,300 acres, and successfully manipulated the imperial
system to establish his family’s economic security. Such manipulation could bring
in vast sums. The brother of an officer in the Royal Highland Emigrants estimated
that officer’s income to be £1,200 per annum, enough to sustain two properties
in New York and provide his four-year-old son with a lieutenant’s commission
when he reached maturity. “All this,” the officer’s brother reported, “owing to
his merited and spirited behaviour on Bunker’s Hill.”69
It is impossible to say with precision how many Highlanders owned land or
benefited from imperial land grants throughout the Revolutionary period. Land
grants to Highlanders in North Carolina numbered 691 prior to 1775, repre-
senting over 20 percent of the Highland male population of the colony but in-
dicating that many still rented or labored on other people’s lands. What was
significant, however, was the aspiration to own land. The most common means
of Highlanders’ acquiring colonial land in this period was through land grants;
technically, such grants did not involve ownership—but because they were awarded
on the basis of limited quit rents and requirements that some of the land be
cultivated within three years, land grants did not possess the potential for a return
to rack-renting and thus satisfied the Highlanders’ desire for property and liberty.
Many Highlanders quickly used their grants to establish credit to purchase full
ownership of surrounding lands, either land grants that were unoccupied or land
on offer by local sellers. The economy of land was an active part of Highland
settlements in the New World. The collective objective was simply to “live in a
state of comfort and independence” afforded by the stable income of owned
property. The strength of loyalism in Cross Creek might be explained by the desire
to gain land ownership in an area where most were still not outright owners, or
68 Charles, Lord Cornwallis, to Francis Edward, Lord Rawdon, April 1781, Cross Creek, NC, TNA,
PRO30/11/79, fol. 2; see also Rawdon to Cornwallis, April 1781, Camden, SC, TNA, PRO30/11/
101, fol. 8, in which Cornwallis allows the recruitment of a Highland Company in North Carolina on
the basis of “grants of lands according to his majesty’s Proclamation.”
69 William MacDonald Land Grant Papers, Nova Scotia Archives and Records Management, Halifax,
NS, RG20, Series A, vol. 1; Donald B. Smith, “From Swords to Ploughshares: The Context for Highland
Soldier Settlement in Nova Scotia, 1710–1775” (MA thesis, St. Mary’s University, 2003), 107–42;
Patrick Campbell to Duncan Campbell of Glenure, 1 March 1777, NAS, GD170/1065/3/1.
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even possessors, of land.70 These aspirations were reflected in the established loyalist
regiments. Colonel John Small of the Royal Highland Emigrants stated in 1785
that almost 700 of his soldiers had settled in Nova Scotia alone. A minority of
men recruited from the Highlands, certainly less than 40 percent, ever returned
to Scotland but, instead, sought land in British North America.71
For the Mohawk Valley Highlanders there was a clear imperative to embrace
loyalism. Fifty families settled on Sir William Johnson’s lands, all of whom were
given 50–200 acres of land at just £6 per 100 acres, with no rents to pay until
the farms were established. With their available credit, some, such as the settler
John Cameron, began buying more land and were invested, economically and
emotionally, in their farms. Many had cleared an average of 2–8 acres when the
Revolution began; this land not only had to be protected but might, through
military service, be expanded up to four times the original allotment and on even
better terms than Johnson had offered. Whereas the major leaders of the High-
landers chose loyalism, the rank-and-file were men of modest means, sometimes
subrenters working on land rented by others from Johnson, suggesting that they
land in the absence of credit.72 For instance, Donald Cameron possessed no land
and made his living from three cows he was permitted to graze on the 12 acres
owned by Angus Cameron near Johnstown. Donald Cameron joined the King’s
Royal Regiment of New York in 1776 but transferred to the Royal Highland
Emigrants, whose land grants were of greater value. His landlord did not join the
loyalists until 1777.73 When making postwar claims, Highland loyalists included
the valuation of their lands, often at inflated rates. The result was modest High-
landers claiming over £100 sterling in compensation for their losses in the war.
Some of the Mohawk Valley Highlanders who had arrived in 1773 were not in
full possession of their land grants before the war broke out, and there was un-
derstandable support for the maintenance of the pre-1775 political order, to ensure
that these lands were delivered to them.74 The aspiration to landholding was the
most important motivational factor in Highland loyalism. Given the number of
loyalist claims from Highlanders that indicated they had rented from Johnson,
and the number of men disarmed by Philip Schuyler in 1776—from 200 to 300
Highlanders in all, almost as many eligible Highland males as lived in the area—we
70 Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of Donald Morrison, TNA, AO12/34, fol. 357; “Observes
or Remarks upon the lands and islands which compose the barony called Harris,” Lee Papers, NLS,
MS 3431, fol. 80.
71 John Small to Charles Morris, 5 September 1785, Windsor, NS, NAS, GD174/2177/10; Reg-
imental returns of 2/71st Foot, April 1783, TNA, WO12/7847.
72 Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of John Cameron, TNA, AO12/27, fol. 209; Loyalist
Claims Commission Testimony of John Macdonnell, TNA, AO12/29, fol. 245; Loyalist Claims Com-
mission Testimony of Donald Ross, TNA, AO12/29, fol. 54; Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony
of Ranald MacDonald, TNA, AO12/27, fol. 157; Petition of Alexander Macdonnell, June 1776, TNA,
WO28/9, fol. 159.
73 Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of Donald Cameron, TNA, AO12/29, fol. 210; Loyalist
Claims Commission Testimony of Angus Cameron, TNA, AO12/29, fol. 250; it is not known if there
was any familial relationship between the two men.
74 Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of Alexander Cameron, TNA, AO12/26, fol. 411; Loyalist
Claims Commission Testimony of Alexander Cameron, TNA, AO12/29, fol. 203.
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must conclude that the number of subtenant Gaels who served the loyalist cause
was a significant majority.75
THE SPECTRUM OF LOYALTIES
As a political stance, Highland loyalism was vulnerable to shifting contexts, and
Highlanders displayed a spectrum of loyalist attitudes and actions based on their
ever-changing experiences. The Highlanders were not uniformly loyal to the
crown. This lack of unity developed not in spite of their common assumptions
about land but, rather, because of them. Highlanders who supported the American
Revolution also prioritized obtaining land and securing their liberty. Alexander
McAllister was a supporter of American independence, and although he believed
that the Quebec Act (1774) was an abomination, extending as it did the size of
the province while also restoring French civil law and lifting the strictures on
Catholics holding office, he was most concerned about the closure of the land
offices in North Carolina, an event that he feared would prevent his fellow High-
landers’ access to the colonies. Similar fears were voiced by Lachlan MacIntosh,
an emigrant from Badenoch and a leading member of the independence movement
in Georgia. Both McAllister and MacIntosh took the conspiratorial view that land
office closures were a deliberate British policy to hinder emigration.76
What caused McAllister and McIntosh to arrive at so different a conclusion from
that of the loyalists? Utterly crucial to their respective conclusions was the amount
of time these men had spent in the colonies. Highland loyalists were recent arrivals,
the overwhelming majority having arrived after 1770. Estimates indicate that in
the two years before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, people from the
Scottish Highlands and islands made up over 15 percent of all British emigrants
to the colonies. Before the fall in cattle prices and the famine in Scotland in 1770–
71, only isolated groups of Highlanders had arrived in the colonies, ensuring that
most Highlanders, particularly those who became loyalists, were recent arrivals.
Of the ninety-two Highlanders who fled from the Mohawk Valley to Canada along
with Sir William Johnson’s nephew, Guy Johnson, at the beginning of the war
and later made loyalist claims, seventy-two had arrived in America after 1773. Land
received by Highland immigrants in Cumberland County, North Carolina, in
1774–75 alone equaled all the land grants awarded between 1768 and 1774.77
Recently arrived Highlanders depended on land grants, which would give them
a base for economic expansion. By contrast, earlier arrivals from the Highlands
were by that time deep into the process of expanding their interests through land
purchase and thus were more convinced of their own ability to assert their in-
75 Philip Schuyler to John Hancock, 19 January 1776, in American Archives, ed. Peter Force, 9 vols.
(Washington, DC, 1837–53), 4:828; McLean, The People of Glengarry, 84–86.
76 “St. Andrew’s District Committee Resolves,” December 1774, in Lachlan MacIntosh Papers in
the University of Georgia Libraries, ed. Lilla Miles Hawes (Athens, GA, 1968), 8–12; Alexander Mc-
Allister to Hector McAllister, January 1774, and Alexander McAllister to John Boyd, January 1775,
McAllister Papers, NCSA; Treasury Papers, TNA, T1/624, fols. 107–9; General James Moore to
General Donald MacDonald, 20 February 1776, Camp at Rockfish, NC, in Clark, State Records of
North Carolina, 11:277–78, and see 278–79.
77 Bailyn, Voyagers to the West, 112; Fingerhut, “The Assimilation of Immigrants on the Frontier,”
202; Brown, The King’s Friends, 105; Meyer, Highland Scots, 91.
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dependence through their own success. According to the Index of Land Grants
for North Carolina, land grants frequently predated land purchases, indicating that
new arrivals were rarely in a position for such assertions within the first few years
of settlement. The higher percentage of loyalists in the Cross Creek community
is reflected by the fact that, in 1774–75, Highlanders received 116 land grants,
while purchases made by Highlanders amounted to just 46.78 Claims presented
to the commission established to compensate loyalists seem to confirm the view
that Highland loyalists were more likely to have been recent arrivals. Of the over
one hundred Highland loyalist claims that I have reviewed in detail, only two of
those Highlanders had arrived before 1770 without having served in the Seven
Years’ War, and veterans had always been a minority in loyalists’ regiments.79
American patriots Lachlan MacIntosh, Alexander McAllister, and the New
Yorker Alexander McDougall had all resided in America since at least the
1740s—but what is significant is the nature of their social and economic inte-
gration. As a merchant, Alexander McDougall had concentrated on intercolonial
rather than transatlantic trade, which gave him colonial contacts and outlooks.
For Lachlan MacIntosh, integration was partly generational. He defined British
tyranny as the same kind of oppression that “our fathers were not able to bear.”
He had, moreover, colonial orientations in his commercial and personal contacts
similar to MacDougall’s. MacIntosh had spent time in Bethesda Orphanage in
Savannah, Georgia, under the care of George Whitefield and, at the age of
twenty-one, met Henry Laurens, second president of the Second Continental
Congress. Laurens served as MacIntosh’s mentor and provided him with the
necessary capital to secure 14,000 acres for rice cultivation. McAllister too had
firm political contacts among separatists in North Carolina and represented Cum-
berland County in the Provincial Congress. McAllister’s stance had been shaped
by years of separation from “the mother country,” and by 1775 he had taken
on a descriptive pronoun for all residents of the colonies: “us.”80
It was the ability of these men to integrate themselves into life in the New
World that was vital. Recently arrived Highlanders had integrated themselves into
an imperial worldview in pursuit of advantage; longer-term residents were equally
as integrated, but their worldview was colonial, in pursuit of autonomy. The names
of four Highlanders—all but one of whom would support the Revolution—had
appeared on a petition in 1772 that requested an extension of the franchise in
Cumberland County, for the election of a representative to the General Assembly
of North Carolina. Only a sophisticated political environment could have produced
the six resolves called for by Lachlan MacIntosh and the St. Andrews District
Committee in 1774, which included support not only for Boston but also for local
Georgian concerns as well as a call to end the “abhorrence of the unnatural practise
78 Meyer, Highland Scots, 93.
79 Paul Smith has claimed that most early loyalists were veterans of the Seven Years’ War; see Smith,
Loyalists and Redcoats, 67. This is not borne out by Wallace Brown’s comprehensive study, in which
he highlights that only sixty of the one thousand New York claims came from veterans; see Brown,
The King’s Friends, 90.
80 Harvey Jackson, Lachlan McIntosh and the Politics of Revolutionary Georgia (Athens, GA., 1979),
12–14; “St. Andrew’s District Committee Resolves,” in Hawes, Lachlan MacIntosh Papers, 12; Alex-
ander McAllister to Hector McAllister, 29 November 1770; Alexander McAllister to Hector McAllister,
6 December 1770; Alexander McAllister to John Boyd, January 1775, all in McAllister Papers, NCSA.
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of slavery.” The established Highland communities of Cross Creek and Darien
were divided by the Revolutionary War to an extent that was not apparent in the
Mohawk Valley, where Highland settlements were less established. Accordingly,
there was greater engagement with notions of positive liberty in these communities,
as settlers asserted their rights through political representation and their individual
ability to purchase land through their own success. This, and integration into
colonial rather than imperial networks, was a vital determinant in allegiance.81
Loyalism began to disintegrate when it became evident that the Revolution was
not the threat to Highland interests that their imperial view of the conflict had
led the Highlanders to assume. After initially misjudging the desire of Highland
emigrants to be left alone, Revolutionary authorities in North Carolina became
adroit in their dealings with the Highland communities. Their neutrality was en-
sured by the Revolutionaries’ careful targeting of coercive measures against only
the most recalcitrant. Revolutionary authorities in North Carolina established a
committee to ensure the welfare of the families of exiled loyalists. Death sentences
were rare, and less often still were they carried out. Following the debacle at
Moore’s Creek in February 1776, only a minority of the 800 captured loyalists
spent any significant time in custody; the rest were quickly released. Community
leaders felt an acute sense of betrayal that the ordinary Highlanders had abandoned
them and their loyalism, with Flora MacDonald in particular decrying their in-
gratitude. The Macdonnells in New York refused to join Allan Macdonnell of
Collachie, the emigration leader, in his confinement in Albany and sought the
assistance of local Revolutionary authorities to ensure that they would not be
required to join him. As the war progressed, Highland emigrants came to realize
that consistently supporting the British government was not essential to their
pursuit of individual interest and that following landowning elites into loyalism
was not the most efficient way of securing lands. John McAlpine, petitioner to
General Carleton, received lands on Staten Island in 1778 and retired there, openly
admitting later that he had resisted several attempts to induce him back into active
opposition to the Revolution. That British agents contacted hundreds of High-
landers evinces the large numbers of potential loyalists who remained inactive
within areas of Revolutionary control for significant periods during the war.82
Periodic forays by Revolutionary militias into Cross Creek were so successful
that when Cornwallis arrived in North Carolina in April 1781, he confided, “They
[the Highlanders] are not equal to my expectations.” Land confiscations by Rev-
olutionary authorities were rare, and it would seem that only those emigrants
utterly unwilling to have any dealings with Revolutionary authorities faced any
81 “The Petition [to Josiah Martin] of the Freeholders and Inhabitants of and near Campbelton in
Cumberland County,” 13 March 1772, in Clark, State Records of North Carolina, 9:79; “Journal of
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1774, in Hawes, Lachlan MacIntosh Papers, 12, and see 3; Alexander McAllister to John Boyd, January
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82 Memorandum of Flora MacDonald, NLS, MS 2618 Misc., fol. 82–3; McLean, An Historical
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long-term or fatal consequences in life, liberty, or property.83 Indeed, even in New
York, where broken terrain, proximity to Canada, and Burgoyne’s ill-fated oper-
ation in summer 1777 made it a constant battleground, the motivation to continue
the fight seemed to derive from deeply personal antagonisms, grounded in the
sufferings the Revolutionaries had inflicted on Highland families in the absence
of their loyalist husbands and fathers. Where these personal motivations were less
powerful, Highland emigrants moved carefully toward neutrality and hope for
peace.84
CONCLUSIONS
Highland loyalism was a political movement predicated on a rational reading of
imperial concepts and the perceived strength of the British Empire, both in the
Old World and in the New World. The political and cultural outlook of the
Highland loyalists was truly transatlantic in scope and was shaped by events across
a wide geographic space. Situating the emigrant Highlanders’ relation to the Amer-
ican Revolution in this wider, imperial context provides a far more concrete un-
derstanding of Highland motivations than previous studies have offered. Highland
loyalism itself could not have existed, in fact, if Highlanders had not invested their
ambitions and ideals in that imperial polity. In this respect, Highland loyalism
reflected and overlapped with loyalism more generally. Like other loyalists, the
Highland loyalists saw in the imperial state the best guarantor of their material
interests. The imperial state promoted loyalism through manipulating identity—by
encouraging beliefs, offering benefits, co-opting military strength, and monitoring
the favorable reception of these processes in certain groups on an ongoing basis.
These groups, however, also had agency, and they, in turn, co-opted the imperial
state. When the state was no longer able to provide the advantages of loyalty,
loyalism disintegrated.
Parallels with the motivations of other imperial actors can be drawn, but
Highland loyalism was underpinned by a particularly strong connection to the
hegemonic discourses of imperialism. Most significant, many Highlanders gave
land a primacy above other values. Their connection to land was so strong that
some scholars have suggested that it could subsume or even negate concepts of
83 For the militia forays, see “Report of Committee appointed to enquire into the conduct of in-
surgents and suspected persons,” 20 April 1776, Halifax, NC, in Clark, State Records of North Carolina,
10:594–603; Governor Richard Caswell to C. Harnett, 2 September 1777, New Bern, NC, ibid., 11:
603; introductory note, ibid., 14:iii; “House Journal of the State of North Carolina,” 22 January 1779,
New Bern, NC, ibid., 13:633; and Cornwallis to Rawdon, April 1781, Cross Creek, NC, TNA, PRO30/
11/79, fol. 2; Benjamin Franklin Stevens, ed., The campaign in Virginia 1781: An Exact Reprint of
Six Rare Pamphlets on the Clinton-Cornwallis (London, 1888), 10; and Brown, The King’s Friends,
197. For Highlanders who received mistreatment, see Loyalist Claims Commission Testimony of Donald
MacDonald, TNA, AO12/34, fol. 409; see also Daniel Klaus to William Knox, 16 October 1777,
Montreal, in Davies, Documents of the American Revolution, 14:219–24; and “Account of William
Gipson,” in The Revolution Remembered: Eyewitness Accounts of the War for Independence, ed. John C.
Dann (Chicago, 1983), 188–89, and see 186–89.
84 For these antagonisms, see McLean, The People of Glengarry, 96; for hopes of peace among
Highland loyalists, see MacDonald to Mr Walter, 4 November 1775, Halifax, NS, in Letterbook of
Captain Alexander MacDonald, 217; and Colin Shaw to Sally Shaw, 14 October 1778, Shaw Papers,
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identity.85 The argument presented here suggests otherwise; land strengthened a
sense of identity, because what the empire offered was a compelling alternative to
the economic problems of the Highlands. Changing views of liberty and property
in the Highlands were subsumed by the imperial administration to motivate and
gain the loyalty of Highland emigrants to North America. They rejected the emerg-
ing United States not because they misunderstood the political context of the
American Revolution but because their interests appeared to be better served by
the British Empire.
Samuel Johnson had been wrong to worry about the loyalties of the Gaelic
emigrant, but when he spoke of “rays diverging from a focus,” he had been right.
Highland views passed through an imperial prism, creating a spectrum of loyalisms
in pursuit of Highland interests; the further that spectrum emerged from the prism,
the more divergent the kinds of loyalism became. Highland emigrants in North
America could be relied upon only as long as those emigrants identified with the
political prejudices of the imperial state. Ultimately, the Highlanders fought not
for the king or the state, through fear or deference, but for their own ends: land,
liberty, and the tangible, if debated, potential of a New World.
85 Andrew Mackillop, “For King, Country and Regiment? Motive and Identity in Highland Soldiery,
1746–1815,” in Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience, c. 1500–1900, ed. Steve Murdoch
and Andrew Mackillop (Leiden, 2002), 191.
